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Abstract
For a dataset of label-count pairs, an anonymized histogram is the multiset of
counts. Anonymized histograms appear in various potentially sensitive contexts
such as password-frequency lists, degree distribution in social networks, and es-
timation of symmetric properties of discrete distributions. Motivated by these
applications, we propose the first differentially private mechanism to release
anonymized histograms that achieves near-optimal privacy utility trade-off both
in terms of number of items and the privacy parameter. Further, if the underly-
ing histogram is given in a compact format, the proposed algorithm runs in time
sub-linear in the number of items. For anonymized histograms generated from un-
known discrete distributions, we show that the released histogram can be directly
used for estimating symmetric properties of the underlying distribution.
1 Introduction
Given a set of labels X , a dataset D is a collection of labels and counts, D def= {(x, nx) : x ∈ X}.
An anonymized histogram of such a dataset is the unordered multiset of all non-zero counts without
any label information,
h(D)
def
= {nx : x ∈ X and nx > 0}.
For example, if X = {a, b, c, d}, D = {(a, 8), (b, 0), (c, 8), (d, 3)}, then h(D) = {3, 8, 8}1.
Anonymized histograms do not contain any information about the labels, including the cardinality
of X . Furthermore, we only consider histograms with positive counts. The results can be extended
to histograms that include zero counts. A histogram can also be represented succinctly using preva-
lences. For a histogram h, the prevalence ϕr is the number of elements in the histogram with count
r,
ϕr(h)
def
=
∑
nx∈h
1nx=r.
In the above example, ϕ3(h) = 1, ϕ8(h) = 2, and ϕr(h) = 0 for r /∈ {3, 8}. Anonymized his-
tograms are also referred to as histogram of histograms [1], histogram order statistics [2], profiles [3],
unattributed histograms [4], fingerprints [5], and frequency lists [6].
Anonymized histograms appear in several potentially sensitive contexts ranging from password fre-
quency lists to social networks. Before we proceed to the problem formulation and results, we first
provide an overview of the various contexts where anonymized histograms have been studied under
differential privacy and their motivation.
Password frequency lists: Anonymized password histograms are useful to security researchers
who wish to understand the underlying password distribution in order to estimate the security risks
or evaluate various password defenses [7, 6]. For example, if n(i) is the ith most frequent password,
1
h(D) is a multiset and not a set and duplicates are allowed.
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then λβ =
∑β
i=1 n(i) is the number of accounts that an adversary could compromise with β guesses
per user. Hence, if the server changes the k-strikes policy from 3 to 5, the frequency distribution
can be used to evaluate the security implications of this change. We refer readers to [6, 8] for more
uses of password frequency lists. Despite their usefulness, organizations may be wary of publishing
these lists due to privacy concerns. This is further justified as it is not unreasonable to expect that an
adversary will have some side information based on attacks against other organizations. Motivated
by this, [6] studied the problem of releasing anonymized password histograms.
Degree-distributions in social networks: Degree distributions is one of the most widely studied
properties of a graph as it influences the structure of the graph. Degree distribution can also be
used to estimate linear queries on degree distributions such as number of k-stars. However, some
graphs may have unique degree distributions and releasing exact degree distributions is no more
safer than naive anonymization, which can leave social network participants vulnerable to a variety
of attacks [9, 10, 11]. Thus releasing them exactly can be revealing. Hence, [12, 4, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17]
considered the problem of releasing degree distributions of graphs with differential privacy. Degree
distributions are anonymized histograms over the graph node degrees.
Estimating symmetric properties of discrete distributions: Let k
def
= |X |. A discrete distribution
p is a mapping from a domain X to [0, 1]k such that ∑x px = 1. Given a discrete distribution p
over k symbols, a symmetric property is a property that depends only on the multiset of probabil-
ities [18, 19], e.g., entropy (
∑
x∈X px log
1
px
). Other symmetric properties include support size,
Rényi entropy, distance to uniformity, and support coverage. Given independent samples from an
unknown p, the goal of property estimation is to estimate the value of the symmetric property of
interest for p. Estimating symmetric properties from unknown distributions has received a wide
attention in the recent past e.g., [5, 18, 20, 21, 22, 19] and has applications in various fields from
neuro-science [2] to genetics [23]. Recently, [24] proposed algorithms to estimate support size, sup-
port coverage and entropy with differential privacy. Optimal estimators for symmetric properties
only depend on the anonymized histograms of the samples [1, 19]. Hence, releasing anonymous
histograms with differential privacy would simultaneously yield differentially-private plug-in esti-
mators for all symmetric properties.
2 Differential privacy
2.1 Definitions
Before we outline our results, we first define the privacy and utility aspects of anonymized his-
tograms. Privacy has been studied extensively in statistics and computer science [25, 26, 27, 28] and
references therein. Perhaps the most studied form of privacy is differential privacy (DP) [29, 30],
where the objective is to ensure that an adversary would not infer whether a user is present in the
dataset or not.
We study the problem of releasing anonymized histograms via the lens of global-DP. We begin by
defining the notion of DP. Formally, given a set of datasets H and a notion of neighboring datasets
NH ⊆ H×H, and a query function f : H → Y , for some domainY , then a mechanismM : Y → O
is said to be ǫ-DP, if for any two neighboring datasets (h1, h2) ∈ NH, and all S ⊆ O,
Pr(M(f(h1)) ∈ S) ≤ eǫ Pr(M(f(h2)) ∈ S). (1)
Broadly-speaking ǫ-DP ensures that given the output, an attacker would not be able to differentiate
between any two neighboring datasets. ǫ-DP is also called pure-DP and provides stricter guarantees
than the approximate (ǫ, δ)-DP, where equation (1) needs to hold with probability 1− δ.
Since introduction, DP has been studied extensively in various applications from dataset release to
learning machine learning models [31]. It has also been adapted by industry [32]. There are two
models of DP: server or global or output DP, where a centralized entity has access to the entire
dataset and answers the queries in a DP manner. The second model is local DP, where ǫ-DP is
guaranteed for each individual user’s data [33, 34, 35, 36, 37]. We study the problem of releasing
anonymized histograms under global-DP. Here H is the set of anonymized histograms, f is the
identity mapping, andO = H.
2
2.2 Distance measure
For DP, a general notion of neighbors is as follows. Two datasets are neighbors if and only if one can
be obtained from another by adding or removing a user [28]. Since, anonymized histograms do not
contain explicit user information, we need few definitions to apply the above notion. We first define
a notion of distance between label-count datasets. A natural notion of distance between datasets D1
and D2 over X is the ℓ1 distance, ℓ1(D1, D2) def=
∑
x∈X |nx(D1) − nx(D2)|, where nx(D) is the
count of x in dataset D. Since anonymized histograms do not contain any information about labels,
we define distance between two histograms h1, h2 as
ℓ1(h1, h2)
def
= min
D1,D2:h(D1)=h1,h(D2)=h2
ℓ1(D1, D2). (2)
The following simple lemma characterizes the above distance in terms of counts.
Lemma 1 (Appendix B). For an anonymized histogram h = {nx}, let n(i) be the ith highest count
in the dataset.2 For any two anonymized histograms h1, h2,
ℓ1(h1, h2) =
∑
i≥1
|n(i)(h1)− n(i)(h2)|.
The above distance is also referred to as sorted ℓ1 distance or earth-mover’s distance. With the above
definition of distance, we can define neighbors as follows.
Definition 1. Two anonymized histograms h and h′ are neighbors if and only if ℓ1(h, h′) = 1.
The above definition of neighboring histograms is same as the definition of neighbors in the previous
works on anonymized histograms [4, 6].
3 Previous and new results
3.1 Anonymized histogram estimation
Similar to previous works [6], we measure the utility of the algorithm in terms of the number of
items in the anonymized histogram, n
def
=
∑
nx∈h nx =
∑
r≥1 ϕr(h)r.
Previous results: The problem of releasing anonymized histograms was first studied by [12, 4]
in the context of degree distributions of graphs. They showed that adding Laplace noise to each
count, followed by a post-processing isotonic regression step results in a histogramH with expected
sorted-ℓ22 error of
E[ℓ22(h,H)] = E

∑
i≥1
(n(i)(h1)− n(i)(h2))2

 =∑
r≥0
O
(
log3max(ϕr , 1)
ǫ2
)
= O
(√
n
ǫ2
)
.
Their algorithm runs in time O(n). The problem was also considered in the context of password
frequency lists by [6]. They observed that an exponential mechanism over integer partitions yields
an ǫ-DP algorithm. Based on this, for ǫ = Ω(1/
√
n), they proposed a dynamic programming
based relaxation of the exponential mechanism that runs in time O
(
n3/2
ǫ + n log
1
δ
)
and returns a
histogramH such that
ℓ1(h,H) = O
(√
n+ log 1δ
ǫ
)
,
with probability ≥ 1− δ. Furthermore, the relaxed mechanism is (ǫ, δ)-DP.
The best information-theoretic lower bound for the ℓ1 utility of any ǫ-DP mechanism is due to [38],
who showed that for ǫ ≥ Ω(1/n), any ǫ-DP mechanism has expected ℓ1 error of Ω(√n/√ǫ) for
some dataset.
New results: Following [6], we study the problem in ℓ1 metric. We propose a new DP mechanism
PRIVHIST that satisfies the following:
2For i larger than number of counts in h, n(i) = 0.
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Theorem 1. Given a histogram in the prevalence form h = {(r, ϕr) : ϕr > 0}, PRIVHIST returns
a histogramH and a sum countN that is ǫ-DP. Furthermore, if ǫ > 1, then
E[ℓ1(h,H)] = O
(√
n · e−cǫ) and E[|N − n|] ≤ e−cǫ
for some constant c > 0 and has an expected run time of O˜(√n). If 1 ≥ ǫ = Ω(1/n) then,
E[ℓ1(h,H)] = O
(√
n
ǫ
log
2
ǫ
)
and E[|N − n|] ≤ O
(
1
ǫ
)
,
and has an expected run time of O˜(√nǫ + 1ǫ ).
Together with the lower bound of [38], this settles the optimal privacy utility trade-off for ǫ ∈
[Ω(1/n), 1] up to a multiplicative factor of O(√log(2/ǫ)). We also show that PRIVHIST is near-
optimal for ǫ > 1, by showing the following lower bound.
Theorem 2 (Appendix E). For a given n, let H = {h : n ≤ ∑r rϕr(h) ≤ n + 1}. For any ǫ-DP
mechanismM, there exists a histogram h ∈ H, such that
E[ℓ1(h,M(h))] ≥ Ω(
√
ne−2ǫ).
Theorems 1 and 2 together with [38] show that the the proposed mechanism has near-optimal utility
for all ǫ = Ω(1/n). We can infer the number of items in the dataset by
∑
r r ·ϕr(H). However, this
estimate is very noisy. Hence, we also return the sum of counts N as it is useful for applications in
symmetric property estimation for distributions. Apart from the near-optimal privacy-utility trade-
off, we also show that PRIVHIST has several other useful properties.
Time complexity: By the Hardy-Ramanujan integer partition theorem [39], the number of
anonymized histograms with n items is eΘ(
√
n). Hence, we can succinctly represent them using
O(√n) space. Recall that any anonymized histogram can be written as {(r, ϕr) : ϕr > 0}, where
ϕr is the number of symbols with count r. Let t be the number of distinct counts and let r1, r2, . . . , rt
be the distinct counts with non-zero prevalences. Then ri ≥ i and
n =
t∑
i=1
riϕri ≥
t∑
i=1
ri ≥
t∑
i=1
i ≥ t
2
2
,
and hence there are at most t ≤ √2n non-zero prevalences and h can be represented as {(r, ϕr) :
ϕr > 0} using O(√n) count-prevalence pairs. Histograms are often stored in this format for
space efficiency e.g., password frequency lists in [40]. PRIVHIST takes advantage of this succinct
representation. Hence, given such a succinct representation, it runs time O(√n) as opposed to the
O(n) running time of [12] and O(n3/2) running time of [6]. This is highly advantageous for large
datasets such as password frequency lists with n = 70M data points [6].
Pure vs approximate differential privacy: The only previous known algorithm with ℓ1 utility of
O(√n) is that of [6] and it runs in timeO(n3/2). However, their algorithm is (ǫ, δ)-approximate DP
which is strictly weaker than PRIVHIST, whose output is ǫ-DP. For applications in social networks it
is desirable to have group privacy for large groups [30]. For groups of size k, (ǫ, δ) approximate DP,
scales as (kǫ, ekǫδ)-DP, which can be prohibitive for large values of k. Hence ǫ-DP is preferable.
Applications to symmetric property estimation: We show that the output of PRIVHIST can be
directly applied to obtain near-optimal sample complexity algorithms for discrete distribution sym-
metric property estimation.
3.2 Symmetric property estimation of discrete distributions
For a symmetric property f and an estimator fˆ that uses n samples, let E(fˆ , n) be an upper
bound on the worst expected error over all distributions p with support at most k, E(fˆ , n) def=
maxp∈∆k E[|f(p) − fˆ(Xn)|] . Let sample complexity n(f, α) denote the minimum number of
samples such that E(fˆ , n) ≤ α,
n(f, α)
def
= min{n : E(fˆ , n) ≤ α}.
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Given samplesXn
def
= X1, X2, . . . , Xn, let h(Xn) denote the corresponding anonymous histogram.
For a symmetric property f , linear estimators of the form
fˆ(h(X))
def
=
∑
r≥1
f(r, n) · ϕr(h(Xn),
are shown to be sample-optimal for symmetric properties such as entropy [21], support size [18, 20],
support coverage [22], and Rényi entropy [41], where f(r, n)s are some distribution-independent
coefficients that depend on the property f . Recently, [24] showed that for any given property such
as entropy or support size, one can construct DP estimators by adding Laplace noise to the non-
private estimator. They further showed that this approach is information theoretically near-optimal.
Instead of just computing a DP estimate for a given property, the output of PRIVHIST can be directly
used to estimate any symmetric property. By the post-processing lemma [30], since the output of
PRIVHIST is DP, the estimate is also DP. For an estimator fˆ , let Ln
fˆ
be the Lipschitz constant given
by Ln
fˆ
def
= max(f(1, n),maxr≥1 |f(r, n) − f(r + 1, n)|). If instead of h(Xn), a DP histogram H
and the sum of countsN is available, then fˆ can be modified as
fˆdp
def
=
∑
r≥1
f(r,N) · ϕr(H),
which is differentially private. Using Theorem 1, we show that:
Corollary 1 (Appendix F). Let fˆ satisfy Ln
fˆ
≤ nβ−1, for a β ≤ 0.5. Further, let there exists E
such that |E(fˆ , n) − E(fˆ , n + 1)| ≤ nβ−1. Let fmax = maxp∈∆k f(p). If n(fˆ , α) is the sample
complexity of estimator fˆ , then for ǫ > 1
n(fˆdp, 2α) ≤ max
(
n(fˆ , α),O
((
1
αecǫ
) 2
1−2β
+
1
ǫ
log
fmax
α
))
.
for some constant c > 0. For Ω(1/n) ≤ ǫ ≤ 1,
n(fˆdp, 2α) ≤ max
(
n(fˆ , α),O
((
log(2/ǫ)
α2ǫ
) 1
1−2β
+
1
ǫ
log
fmax
αǫ
))
.
Further, by the post-processing lemma, fˆdp is also ǫ-DP.
For entropy (−∑x px log px), normalized support size (∑x 1px>1/k/k), and normalized support
coverage, there exists sample-optimal linear estimators with β < 0.1 and have the property
|E(fˆ , n) − E(fˆ , n + 1)| ≤ E(fˆ , n)nβ−1 [19, 24]. Hence the sample complexity of the proposed
algorithm increases at most by a polynomial in 1/ǫα. Furthermore, the increase is dependent on
the maximum value of the function for distributions of interest and it does not explicitly depend on
the support size. This result is slightly worse than the property specific results of [24] in terms of
dependence on ǫ and α. In particular, for entropy estimation, the main term in our privacy cost is
O˜
((
1/α2ǫ
) 1
1−2β
)
and the bound of [24] is O (1/(αǫ)1+β). Thus for β = 0.1, our dependence
on ǫ and α is slightly worse. However, we note that our results are more general in that H can be
used with any linear estimator. For example, our algorithm implies DP algorithms for estimating
distance to uniformity, which have been not been studied before. Furthermore, PRIVHIST can also
be combined with the maximum likelihood estimators of [3, 22] and linear programming estimators
of [5], however we do not provide any theoretical guarantees for these combined algorithms.
4 PRIVHIST
In the algorithm description and analysis, let x¯ denote the vector x and let ϕr+(h)
def
=
∑
s≥r ϕs(h)
denote the cumulative prevalences. Since, anonymized histograms are multisets, we can define the
sum of two anonymized histograms as follows: for two histograms h1, h2, the sum h = h1 + h2 is
given by ϕr(h) = ϕr(h1) + ϕr(h2), ∀r. Furthermore, since there is a one-to-one mapping between
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histograms in count form h = {n(i)} and in prevalence form h = {(r, ϕr) : ϕr > 0}, we use both
interchangeably. For the ease of analysis, we also use the notation of improper histogram, where
the ϕr’s can be negative or non-integers. Finally, for a histogram ha indexed by super-script a , we
define ϕa
def
= ϕ(ha) for the ease of notation.
4.1 Approach
Instead of describing the technicalities involved in the algorithm directly, we first motivate the algo-
rithm with few incorrect or high-error algorithms. Before we proceed recall that histograms can be
written either in terms of prevalences ϕr or in terms of sorted counts n(i).
An incorrect algorithm: A naive tendency would be to just add noise only to non-zero prevalences
or counts. However, this is not differentially private. For example, consider two neighboring his-
tograms in prevalence format, h = {ϕ1 = 2} and h′ = {ϕ1 = 1, ϕ2 = 1}. The resulting outputs
for the above two inputs would be very different as the output of h never produces a non-zero ϕ2,
whereas the output of h′ produces non-zero ϕ2 with high probability. Similar counter examples can
be shown for sorted counts.
A high-error algorithm: Instead of adding noise to non-zero counts or prevalences, one can add
noise to all the counts or prevalences. It can be shown that adding noise to all the counts (including
those appeared zero times), yields a ℓ1 errorO(n/ǫ), whereas adding noise to prevalences can yield
an ℓ1 error of O(n2/ǫ), if we naively use the utility bound in terms of prevalences (3). We note
that [12] showed that a post-processing step after adding noise to sorted-counts and improves the
ℓ2 utility. A naive application of Cauchy-Schwarz inequality yields an ℓ1 error of n3/4/ǫ for that
algorithm. While it might be possible to improve the dependence on n by a tighter analysis, it is not
clear if the dependence on ǫ can be improved.
The algorithm is given in PRIVHIST. After some computation, it calls two sub-routines PRIVHIST-
LOWPRIVACY and PRIVHIST-HIGHPRIVACY depending on the value of ǫ. PRIVHIST has two main
new ideas: (i) splitting r around
√
n and using prevalences in one regime and counts in another and
(ii) the smoothing technique used to zero out the prevalence vector. Of the two (i) is crucial for the
computational complexity of the algorithm and (ii) is crucial in improving the ǫ-dependence from
1/ǫ to 1/
√
ǫ in the high privacy regime (ǫ ≤ 1). There are more subtle differences such as using
cumulative prevalences instead of actual prevalences. We highlight them in the next section. We
now overview our algorithm for low and high privacy regimes separately.
4.2 Low privacy regime
We first consider the problem in the low privacy regime when ǫ > 1. We make few observations.
Geometric mechanism vs Laplace mechanism: For obtaining DP output of integer data, one can
add either Laplace noise or geometric noise [42]. For ǫ-DP, the expected ℓ1 noise added by Laplace
mechanism is 1/ǫ, which strictly larger than that of the geometric mechanism (2e−ǫ/(1 − e−2ǫ))
(see Appendix A). For ǫ > 1, we use the geometric mechanism to obtain optimal trade off in terms
of ǫ.
Prevalences vs counts: If we add noise to each coordinate of a d-dimensional vector, the total
amount of noise in ℓ1 norm scales linearly in d, hence it is better to add noise to a small dimensional
vector. In the worst case, both prevalences and counts can be an n-dimensional vector. Hence, we
propose to use prevalences for small values of r ≤ √n, and use counts for r > √n. This ensures
that the dimensionality of vectors to which we add noise is at most 2
√
n.
Cumulative prevalences vs prevalences: The ℓ1 error can be bounded in terms of prevalences as
follows. See Appendix B for a proof.
ℓ1(h1, h2) ≤
∑
r≥1
|ϕr+(h1)− ϕr+(h2)| ≤
∑
r≥1
r|ϕr(h1)− ϕr(h2)|, (3)
If we add noise to prevalences, the ℓ1 error can be very high as noise is multiplied with the corre-
sponding count r (3) . The bound in terms of cumulative prevalencesϕ+ is much tighter. Hence, for
small values of r, we use cumulative prevalences instead of prevalences themselves.
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The above observations provide an algorithm for the low privacy regime. However, there are few
technical difficulties. For example, if we split the counts at a threshold naively, then it is not differ-
entially private. We now describe each of the steps in high-privacy regime and how we overcome
these technical difficulties.
(1) Find
√
n: To divide the histogram into two smaller histograms, we need to know n, which may
not be available. Hence, we allot ǫ1 privacy cost to find a DP value of n.
(2) Sensitivity preserving histogram split: If we divide the histogram into two parts based on
counts naively and analyze the privacy costs independently for the higher and smaller parts sepa-
rately, then the sensitivity would be lot higher for certain neighboring histograms. For example, con-
sider two neighboring histograms h1 = {ϕT = 1, ϕn−T = 1} and h2 = {ϕT+1 = 1, ϕn−T−1 = 1}.
If we divide h1 in to two parts based on threshold T , say hs1 = {ϕT = 1} and hℓ1 = {ϕn−T = 1}
and hs2 = {} and hℓ2 = {ϕT+1 = 1, ϕn−T−1 = 1}, then ℓ1(hℓ1, hℓ2) = T + 2. Thus, the ℓ1 distance
between neighboring separated histograms ℓ1(hℓ1, h
ℓ
2), ℓ1(h
s
1, h
s
2) would be much higher compared
to ℓ1(h2, h2) and we need to add a lot of noise. Therefore, we perturb ϕT and ϕT+1 using geometric
noise. This ensures DP in instances where the neighboring histograms differ at ϕT and ϕT+1, and
doesn’t change the privacy analysis for other types of histograms. However, adding noise may make
the histogram improper as ϕT can become negative. To this end, we add M fake counts at T and
T + 1 to ensure that the histogram is proper with high probability. We remove them later in (L4).
We refer readers to Appendix C.1.1 for details about this step.
(3,4) Add noise: Let Hbs (small counts) and Hbℓ (large counts) be the split-histograms. We add
noise to cumulative prevalences in Hbs and counts in Hbℓ as described in the overview of the pro-
posed algorithm.
(L1, L2) Post-processing: The noisy versions of ϕr+ may not satisfy the properties satisfied by
the histograms i.e., ϕr+ ≥ ϕ(r+1)+ . To overcome this, we run isotonic regression over noisy
ϕr+ subject to the monotonicity constraints i.e., given noisy counts ϕr+ , find ϕ
mon
r+ that minimizes∑
r≤T (ϕr+ − ϕmonr+ )2, subject to the constraint that ϕmonr+ ≥ ϕmon(r+1)+ , for all r ≤ T . Isotonic
regression in one dimension can be run linear in the number of inputs using Pool Adjacent Vio-
lators Algorithm (PAVA) or its variants [43, 44]. Hence, the time complexity of this algorithm is
O(T ) ≈ √n. We then round the prevalences to the nearest non-negative integers. We similarly
post-process large counts and remove the fake counts that we introduced in step (2).
Since we used succinct representation of histograms, used prevalences for r smaller than O(√n)
and counts otherwise, the expected run time of the algorithm is O(√n) for ǫ > 1.
4.3 High privacy regime
For the high-privacy regime, when ǫ ≤ 1, all known previous algorithms achieve an error of 1/ǫ. To
reduce the error from 1/ǫ to 1/
√
ǫ, we use smoothing techniques to reduce the sensitivity and hence
reduce the amount of added noise.
Smoothing method: Recall that the amount of noise added to a vector depends on its dimensionality.
Since prevalences have length n, the amount of ℓ1 noise would be O(n/ǫ). To improve on this, we
first smooth the input prevalence vector such that it is non-zero only for few values of r and show
that the smoothing method reduces the sensitivity of cumulative prevalences and hence reduces the
amount of noise added.
While applying smoothing is the core idea, two questions remain: how to select the location of non-
zero values and how to smooth to reduce the sensitivity? We now describe these technical details.
(H1) Approximate high prevalences: Recall that N was obtained by adding geometric noise to n.
In the rare case that this geometric noise is very negative, then there can be prevalences much larger
than 2N . This can affect the smoothing step. To overcome this, we move all counts above 2N to N .
Since this changes the histogram with low probability, it does not affect the ℓ1 error.
(H2) Compute boundaries: We find a set of boundaries S and smooth counts to elements in S.
Ideally we would like to ensure that there is a boundary that exists close to every count. For small
values of r, we ensure this by adding all the counts and hence there is no smoothing. If r ≈ √n, we
use boundaries that are uniform in the log-count space. However, using this technique for all values
of r, results in an additional logn factor. To overcome this, for r ≫ √n, we use the noisy large
counts in step (4) to find the boundaries and ensure that there is a boundary close to every count.
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(H3) Smooth prevalences: For a r that lies between two boundaries si and si+1, we divide ϕr into
ϕsi and ϕsi+1 as follows. We assign
si+1−r
si+1−si fraction of ϕr to ϕsi and the remaining to ϕsi+1 . If
two neighboring histograms differ in ϕr and ϕr+1, then after smoothing, ϕsi and ϕsi+1 differ by
1/(si+1−si). Hence the sensitivity goes down to 1/(si+1−si) and we can add less noise. We refer
readers to Appendix C.1.2 for details about this step.
(H4) Add small noise: Since the prevalences are smoothed, we add small amount of noise to the
corresponding cumulative prevalences. For ϕsi+, we add L(1/(si − si−1)ǫ) to obtain DP.
(H5) Post-processing: Finally, we post-process the prevalences similar to (L1) to impose mono-
tonicity and ensure that the resulting prevalences are positive and non-negative integers.
Since we used succinct histogram representation, ensured that the size of S is small, and used counts
larger than O(√nǫ) to find boundaries, the expected run time is O(√nǫ + lognǫ ) for ǫ ≤ 1.
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Algorithm PRIVHIST
Input: anonymized histogram h in terms of prevalences i.e., {(r, ϕr) : ϕr > 0}, privacy cost ǫ.
Parameters: ǫ1 = ǫ2 = ǫ3 = ǫ/3.
Output: DP anonymized histogramH and N (an estimate of n).
1. DP value of the total sum: N = max(
∑
nx∈h nx + Z
a, 0), where Za ∼ G(e−ǫ1). If N = 0,
output empty histogram and N . Otherwise continue.
2. Split h: Let T = ⌈√N min(ǫ, 1)⌉ andM = ⌈max(2 logNeǫ2 ,1)ǫ2
⌉
.
(a) Ha : ϕaT = ϕT +M,ϕ
a
T+1 = ϕT+1 +M and ∀r /∈ {T, T + 1}, ϕar = ϕr .
(b) Hb : ϕbT+1 = ϕ
a
T+1 + Z
b, ϕbT = ϕ
b
T − Zb and ∀r /∈ {T, T + 1} ϕbr = ϕar , where Zb ∼
G(e−ǫ2).
(c) DivideHb into two histogramsHbs andHbℓ. For all r ≥ T +1, ϕbℓr = max(0,
∑r
s=T+1 ϕ
b
r−∑r−1
s=T+1 ϕ
bℓ
r ) for all r ≤ T ϕbsr = max(0,
∑T
s=r ϕ
b
r −
∑T
s=r+1 ϕ
b
r).
3. DP value ofHbs. Let Zcsr ∼ G(e−ǫ2) i.i.d. andHcs be ϕcsr+ = ϕbsr+ + Zcsr for r ≤ T .
4. DP value ofHbℓ: Let Zcℓi ∼ G(e−ǫ2) i.i.d. andHcℓ be N cℓi = N bℓ(i) + Zcℓi for N(i) ∈ Hbℓ.
5. If ǫ > 1, output PRIVHIST-LOWPRIVACY(Hcs, Hcℓ, T,M) and N .
6. If ǫ ≤ 1, output PRIVHIST-HIGHPRIVACY(Hcℓ , h,N, ǫ3) and N .
Algorithm PRIVHIST-LOWPRIVACY
Input: low-count histogramHcs, high-count histogramHcℓ, T,M and Output: a histogramH .
L1. Post processing ofHcs:
(a) Find ϕ¯mon that minimizes
∑
r≥1(ϕ
mon
r+ − ϕr+(Hcs))2. with ϕmonr+ ≥ ϕmon(r+1)+, ∀r.
(b) FindHds such that for all r, ϕdsr+ = round(max(ϕ
mon
r+ , 0)).
L2. Post processing ofHcℓ: ComputeHdℓ = {max(Ni(Hcℓ), T ), ∀i}.
L3. LetHd = Hds +Hdℓ.
L4. ComputeHe by removingM elements closest to T+1 fromHd and then removingM elements
closest to T and output it.
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Algorithm PRIVHIST-HIGHPRIVACY
Input: non-private histogram h, high-count histogramHℓ, T,N, ǫ3 and Output: a histogramH .
H1. Approximate higher prevalences: for r < 2N , ϕur = ϕr(h) and ϕ
u
2N = ϕ2N+(h).
H2. Compute boundaries: Let the set S be defined as follows:
(a) T ′ = ⌈10√N/ǫ33⌉, q =√log(1/ǫ3)/Nǫ3
(b) S = {1, 2, . . . , T }∪{⌊T (1+q)i⌋ : i ≤ log1+q(T ′/T )}∪{Nx : Nx ∈ Hℓ, Nx ≥ T ′}∪{2N}.
H3. Smooth prevalences: Let si denote the ith smallest element in S.
(a) ϕvsi =
∑si+1
j=si
ϕuj · si+1−jsi+1−si +
∑si−1
j=si−1
ϕuj · j−si−1si−si−1 and if j /∈ S, ϕvj = 0.
H4. DP value ofHv: for each si ∈ S, let ϕwsi+ = ϕvsi+ + Zsi , where Zsi ∼ L
(
1
ǫ3(si−si−1)
)
.
H5. FindHx that minimizes
∑
si∈S(ϕ
x
si+ − ϕwsi+)2(si − si−1)2 such that ϕxsi+ ≥ ϕxsi+1+∀i.
H6. ReturnHy given by, ϕyr+ = round(max(ϕ
x
r+ , 0)) ∀r.
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Appendix: Differentially private anonymized histograms
A Geometric mechanism
The mostly popular mechanism for ǫ-DP is the Laplace mechanism, which is defined as follows.
Definition 2 (Laplace mechanism (L(b)) [30]). When the true query result is f , the mechanism
outputs f + Z where Z is a random variable distributed as a Laplace distribution distribution:
Pr(Z = z) = 12b exp
(
− |x|b
)
for every z ∈ R. If output of f has sensitivity∆, then to achieve ǫ-DP
add Z ∼ L(∆/ǫ).
Since, we have integer inputs, we use the geometric mechanism:
Definition 3 (Geometric mechanism (G(α)) [42]). When the true query result is f , the mechanism
outputs f + Z where Z is a random variable distributed as a two-sided geometric distribution:
Pr(Z = z) = 1−α1+α · α|z| for every integer z. If output of f is integers and has sensitivity ∆ (an
integer), then to achieve ǫ-DP add Z ∼ G(eǫ/∆).
[42] showed that geometric mechanism is universally optimal for a general class of functions under
a Bayesian framework. Geometric mechanism is beneficial over Laplace mechanism in two ways:
The output space of the mechanism is discrete. Since we have integer inputs, this removes the
necessity of adding rounding off the outputs. For ǫ-DP, the expected ℓ1 noise added by the Laplace
mechanism is 1/ǫ, which strictly larger than that of the geometric mechanism (2e−ǫ/(1 − e−2ǫ))
(see below). For moderate values of ǫ, this difference is a constant. We now state few properties of
geometric distribution which are used in the rest of the paper.
We find the following set of equations useful in the rest of the paper. In the following let ZG ∼
G(e−ǫ) be a geometric random variable and ZL ∼ L(1/ǫ) be a Laplace random variable.
E[ZG] = 0 = E[ZL].
E[|ZG|] = 2e
−ǫ
1− e−2ǫ ≤
1
ǫ
= E[|ZL|].
E[Z2G] =
2e−ǫ
(1− e−ǫ)2 ≤
2
ǫ2
= E[Z2L].
The next lemma bounds moments ofmax(n+ Z, 0) when Z is a zero mean random variable.
Lemma 2. Let Z be a random variable and n ≥ 0. If Y = max(n+ Z, 0), then
E[|Y − n|] ≤ E|Z|,
and
E
[
1Y >0
Y
]
≤ 1
n
+
E[Z2]
2n2
.
Proof. To prove the first inequality, observe that
|Y − n| = |max(Z,−n)| ≤ |Z|.
Taking expectation yields the first equation. For the second term,
1
Y
=
1
n
+
n− Y
Y n
=
1
n
+
n− Y
n2
+
(n− Y )2
n2Y
≤ 1
n
+
n− Y
n2
+
(n− Y )2
2n2
. (4)
Furthermore,
(n− Y )1Y >0 = −Z1Y>0 = −Z1−Z<n ≤ −Z.
Combining the above two equations and using the fact that |Y −n| ≤ |Z| yields the second equation
in the lemma.
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B Properties of the distance metric
Proof of Lemma 1. Recall that the distance between to histograms is given by
ℓ1(h1, h2)
def
= min
D1,D2:h(D1)=h1,h(D2)=h2
ℓ1(D1, D2) = min
D1,D2:h(D1)=h1,h(D2)=h2
∑
x∈X
|nx(D1)− nx(D2)|.
Let D∗1 and D
∗
2 be the datasets that achieve the minimum above. Consider any two labels x, y
such that nx(D∗1) ≥ ny(D∗1). Let D′2 be the dataset obtained as follows: ny(D′2) = nx(D∗2) and
nx(D
′
2) = ny(D
∗
2) and for all other z /∈ {x, y}, nz(D′2) = nz(D∗2). Since D∗2 is the optimum,
ℓ1(D
∗
1 , D
∗
2) ≤ ℓ1(D∗1 , D′2).
Expanding both sides and canceling common terms, we get,
|nx(D∗1)− nx(D∗2)|+ |ny(D∗1)− ny(D∗2)| ≤ |nx(D∗1)− nx(D′2)|+ |ny(D∗1)− ny(D′2)|
≤ |nx(D∗1)− ny(D∗2)|+ |ny(D∗1)− nx(D∗2)|,
and thus if nx(D∗1) ≥ ny(D∗1), then nx(D∗2) ≥ ny(D∗2). Hence, the label of the ith highest count
in both the datasets should be the same and
ℓ1(D
∗
1 , D
∗
2) =
∑
x∈X
|nx(D∗1)− nx(D∗2)| =
∑
i≥1
|n(i)(h1)− n(i)(h2)|.
The distance measure satisfies triangle inequality, i.e., for any three histograms h1, h2, and h3,
ℓ1(h1, h2) ≤ ℓ1(h1, h3) + ℓ1(h2, h3).
The proof of the above equation is a simple consequence of Lemma 1 and is omitted. We now show
that dividing histograms only increases the distance.
Lemma 3. If h = h1 + h2 and h
′ = h′1 + h
′
2, then
ℓ1(h, h
′) ≤ ℓ1(h1, h′1) + ℓ1(h2, h′2).
Proof. Since the elements in h1 + h2 are same as elements in h and elements in h′1 + h
′
2 are same
as elements in h2, there exists a permutation σ such that
ℓ1(h1, h
′
1) + ℓ1(h2, h
′
2) =
∑
i≥1
|n(i)(h1)− n(i)(h′1)|+
∑
i≥1
|n(i)(h2)− n(i)(h′2)|
=
∑
i≥1
|n(i)(h)− n(σi)(h′)|.
Similar to proof of Lemma 1, it can be shown that the σ that minimizes the above sum is the one
that matches ith highest count in h to ith highest count in h′ and hence
ℓ1(h, h
′) =
∑
i≥1
|n(i)(h)− n(i)(h′)| ≤
∑
i≥1
|n(i)(h)− n(σi)|.
It is useful to have few upper bounds on the ℓ1 distance over histograms.
Lemma 4. For any two histograms h1, h2,
ℓ1(h1, h2) ≤
rmax(h1,h2)∑
r≥1
|ϕr+(h1)− ϕr+(h2)| ≤
∑
r≥1
r|ϕr(h1)− ϕr(h2)|, (5)
where rmax(h1, h2) is the maximum r such that ϕr(h1) + ϕr(h2) ≥ 0.
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Proof. We prove the first inequality by induction on rmax(h1, h2). Suppose rmax(h1, h2) = 1, then
the inequality holds trivially as
∑
i
|n(i)(h1)− n(i)(h2)| = |ϕ1(h1)− ϕ1(h2)| =
rmax(h1,h2)∑
r=1
|ϕr+(h1)− ϕr+(h2)|.
Now suppose it holds for all rmax(h1, h2) < r0. For r0
def
= rmax(h1, h2). Let h′1 and h
′
2 be two
datasets obtained as follows:
h′i = max(nx, r0 − 1) : nx ∈ hi}.
This mapping preserves the ordering of n(i)s up to ties and rmax(h′1, h
′
2) = r0 − 1. Thus,
ℓ1(h
′
1, h
′
2) ≤
rmax(h
′
1,h
′
2)∑
r=1
|ϕr+(h′1)− ϕr+(h′2)| =
rmax(h1,h2)−1∑
r=1
|ϕr+(h1)− ϕr+(h2)|. (6)
Hence,∑
i
|n(i)(h1)− n(i)(h2)|
=
∑
i:max(n(i)(h1),n(i)(h2))<r0
|n(i)(h1)− n(i)(h2)|+
∑
i:max(n(i)(h1),n(i)(h2))≥r0
|n(i)(h1)− n(i)(h2)|
=
∑
i:max(n(i)(h1),n(i)(h2))<r0
|n(i)(h′1)− n(i)(h′2)|
+
∑
i:max(n(i)(h1),n(i)(h2))≥r0
|n(i)(h′1)− n(i)(h′2) + 1n(i)(h1)=r0 − 1n(i)(h′2)=r0 |
≤
∑
i:max(n(i)(h1),n(i)(h2))<r0
|n(i)(h′1)− n(i)(h′2)|+
∑
i:max(n(i)(h1),n(i)(h2))≥r0
|n(i)(h′1)− n(i)(h′2)|
+
∑
i:max(n(i)(h1),n(i)(h2))≥r0
|1n(i)(h1)=r0 − 1n(i)(h′2)=r0 |
= ℓ1(h
′
1, h
′
2) + |ϕr0(h1)− ϕr0(h2)|
Combining the above equationwith Equation (6) yields the first inequality. For the second inequality,
observe that
rmax(h1,h2)∑
r≥1
|ϕr+(h1)− ϕr+(h2)| =
rmax(h1,h2)∑
r≥1
|
∑
s≥r
ϕs(h1)− ϕs(h2)|
≤
rmax(h1,h2)∑
r≥1
∑
s≥r
|ϕs(h1)− ϕs(h2)|
=
∑
s≥1
s|ϕs(h1)− ϕs(h2)|,
where the inequality follows by triangle inequality and the last equality follows by observing that
each term corresponding to index s appears exactly s times.
We now show a simple property of rounding off integers.
Lemma 5. Let x1, x2, . . . , xn be integers. Let y1, y2, . . . , yn be real numbers. Let yˆi be the nearest
integer to yi. Then,
n∑
i=1
|xi − yˆi| ≤ 2
n∑
i=1
|xi − yi|.
Proof. For any i,
|xi − yˆi| ≤ |xi − yi|+ |yi − yˆi| ≤ 2|xi − yi|,
where the second inequality follows from the observation that yˆi is the nearest integer to yi. Sum-
ming over all indices i yields the lemma.
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We need the next auxilllary lemma, which we use in the proofs.
Lemma 6. For a histogram h1, let h
′
1 be the histogram obtained by adding k elements of value t to
h. Let h′2 be another histogram and let h2 is obtained by removing k elements that are closest to t.
Then
ℓ1(h1, h2) ≤ 2ℓ1(h′1, h′2).
Proof. Let h′′2 be the histogram obtained by adding k elements of value t to h2. Since adding same
number of elements to two datasets do not decrease the ℓ1 distance,
ℓ1(h1, h2) = ℓ1(h
′
1, h
′′
2) ≤ ℓ1(h′1, h′2) + ℓ1(h′2, h′′2),
where the second inequality follows by triangle inequality. Consider the set of all histograms that
have ϕt ≥ k. Both h′′2 and h′1 belong to this set. It can be shown that of all histograms in that set h′′2
is closest to h′2 and hence
ℓ1(h
′
2, h
′′
2) ≤ ℓ1(h′1, h′2),
and hence the lemma.
C Privacy analysis of PRIVHIST
C.1 Overview of privacy analysis
We break the analysis of PRIVHIST step by step. We will show that release ofN (step (1)) is ǫ1-DP.
Then, we show that Hcs and Hcℓ are ǫ2-DP. Observe that PRIVHIST-LOWPRIVACY is just a post-
processing step and by the post processing lemma does not need any differentialy privacy analysis.
Finally we show that PRIVHIST-HIGHPRIVACY is ǫ3 differentially private. By the composition
theorem [30], it follows that the total privacy cost is ǫ1 + ǫ2 + ǫ3 = ǫ and hence the privacy cost in
Theorem 1. Of the above steps, provingN is ǫ1-DP is straightforward and a sketch is in Lemma 7.
Proving Hcs and Hcℓ is ǫ2-DP is more involved and is in Lemma 8. The main intuition behind
Lemma 8 is a sensitivity preserving histogram split, which we describe below.
C.1.1 Sensitivity preserving histogram split
Any two neighboring datasets h1 and h2 can fall into one of three categories:
1. They differ in ϕT and ϕT+1.
2. They differ in ϕr and ϕr+1 for some 0 ≤ r < T − 1.
3. They differ in ϕr and ϕr+1 for some r > T .
For cases 2 and 3 above, it suffices to add noise to cumulative prevalences and counts as in (3) and (4).
However, if they differ in ϕT and ϕT+1, the analysis is more involved. For example, consider the
following simple example. h1 = {ϕT = 1, ϕn−T = 1} and h2 = {ϕT+1 = 1, ϕn−T−1 = 1}. h1
and h2 have ℓ1 distance of one and are neighbors. If we divide h1 in to two parts based on threshold
T , say hs1 = {ϕT = 1} and hℓ1 = {ϕn−T = 1} and hs2 = {} and hℓ2 = {ϕT+1 = 1, ϕn−T−1 = 1},
then ℓ1(hℓ1, h
ℓ
2) = T + 2. Thus, if we naively add noise to cumulative prevalences for r ≤ T
and to counts r > T , then we need to add noise L(T/ǫ), which makes the utility of the algorithm
much worse. To overcome this, we preprocess h by moving Zb mass from ϕT to ϕT+1, where Zb
is a Geometric random variable. This provides the required privacy without increasing the utility
considerably. Finally, moving mass Zb can make the histogram to have negative prevalences. To
overcome this, we addM fake counts to ϕT and ϕT+1.
C.1.2 Smoothing method
The main ingredient in proving better utility in the high privacy regime is the smoothing technique,
which we describe now with an example. Suppose we know that all histograms have non-zero
prevalences only between counts s and s+t and further supposewe have two neighboring histograms
h1 and h2 as follows. ϕ1r = 1 and ϕ
1
i = 0, for all i ∈ [s, s+ t] \ {r} and ϕ2r+1 = 1 and ϕ1i , for all
i ∈ [s, s+ t] \ {r + 1}. If we want to release the prevalences or cumulative prevalences, we add ℓ1
noise of 1/ǫ for each prevalence in [s, s+ t]. Thus the total amount of noise would be O(t/ǫ). We
propose to reduce this noise by smoothing prevalences.
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For a r ∈ [s, s + t] , we divide ϕr into ϕs and ϕs+t as follows. We assign s+t−rt fraction of
ϕr to ϕs and the remaining to ϕs+t. After this transformation, the first histogram becomes ht1
given by, ϕt1s =
t+s−r
t and ϕ
t1
s =
r
t and all other prevalences are zero. Similarly, the second
histogram becomes, ht2 ϕt2s =
t+s−r−1
t and ϕ
t1
s =
r+1
t and all other prevalences are zero. Thus
the prevalences after smoothing differ only in two locations s and s + t and they differ by at most
1/t. Thus the total amount of noise needed for a DP release is O(1/tǫ) to these two prevalences.
However, note that we also incur a loss as due to smoothing, which can be shown to beO(t). Hence,
the total amount of error would be O(1/(tǫ) + t). Choosing t = 1/√ǫ, yields a total error of
O(1/√ǫ). The above analysis is for a toy example and extending it to general histograms requires
additional work. In particular, we need to find the smoothing boundaries that give the best utility.
As described in Section 4.3, we choose boundaries based on logarithmic partition of counts and also
by private values of counts. The utility analysis with these choice of boundaries is in Appendix D.2.
C.1.3 Choise of ǫ1, ǫ2, ǫ3
We note that there is no particular reason for ǫ1, ǫ2, and ǫ3 to be equal and we chose those values for
simplicity and easy readability. For example, since ǫ1 is just used to estimate n, the analysis of the
algorithm shows that ǫ2, ǫ3 affects utility more than ǫ1. Hence, we can set ǫ2 = ǫ3 = ǫ(1− o(1))/2
and ǫ1 = o(ǫ) to get better practical results. Furthermore, for low privacy regime, the algorithm only
uses a privacy budget of ǫ1 + ǫ2. Hence, we can set ǫ1 = o(1), ǫ2 = ǫ(1− o(1)), and ǫ3 = 0.
C.2 Technical details
We first prove a dataset depending composition theorem that helps us decompose differential privacy
analysis depending on the dataset.
Theorem 3 (Dataset dependent composition theorem). Let Z1, Z2, . . . , Zn be a set of independent
random variables. LetX1 = f1(x, Z1) be a deterministic function. Similarly letXi = fi(Xi−1, Zi)
be deterministic functions for 2 ≤ i ≤ n. If for any two neighboring data sets x and x′,
min
i≥1
max
z1,z2,...zi−1,xi
Pr(Xi = xi|x, z1, z2, . . . zi−1)
Pr(Xi = xi|x′, z1, z2, . . . zi−1) ≤ e
ǫ, 3 (7)
thenXn is an ǫ-DP output.
Proof. For any two datasets, since x→ X1 → Xn is a Markov chain,
Pr(Xn = xn|x) =
∑
xi
Pr(Xn = xn|Xi = xi) · Pr(Xi = xi|x).
Hence for any two datasets x, x′, any xn, for all i,
Pr(Xn = xn|x)
Pr(Xn = xn|x′) =
∑
x1
Pr(Xn = xn|Xi = xi) · Pr(Xi = xi|x)∑
xi
Pr(Xn = xn|Xi = xi) · Pr(Xi = xi|x′) ≤ maxxi
Pr(Xi = xi|x′)
Pr(Xi = xi|x) .
Similarly for any i,
Pr(Xi = xi|x) =
∑
z1,z2,...,zj−1
Pr(Xj = xj |x, z1, z2, . . . , zi−1) · Pr(z1, z2, . . . zi−1).
Hence for any two datasets x, x′,
Pr(Xi = xi|x)
Pr(Xi = xi|x′) =
∑
z1,z2,...,zi−1
Pr(Xi = xi|x, z1, z2, . . . , zi−1) · Pr(z1, z2, . . . zi−1)∑
z1,z2,...,zi−1
Pr(Xi = xi|x′, z1, z2, . . . , zi−1) · Pr(z1, z2, . . . zi−1)
≤ max
z1,z2,...zi−1
Pr(Xi = xi|x, z1, z2, . . . , zi−1)
Pr(Xi = xi|x′, z1, z2, . . . , zi−1) .
Hence,
max
xn
Pr(Xn = xn|x)
Pr(Xn = xn|x′) ≤ mini≥1 maxxi
Pr(Xi = xi|x′)
Pr(Xi = xi|x)
≤ min
i≥1
max
xi
max
z1,z2,...zi−1
Pr(Xi = xi|x, z1, z2, . . . , zi−1)
Pr(Xi = xi|x′, z1, z2, . . . , zi−1) ,
3For notational simplicity, let z01 = ∅.
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and hence for every pair of datasets if the right hand side is smaller than eǫ, thenXn is diffferentially
private.
C.3 Privacy analysis
We start with provingN is ǫ1-DP.
Lemma 7. N is ǫ1-DP.
Proof sketch. The proof follows from Definition 3 and the fact that for any two neighboring datasets
h1, h2, n(h1) − n(h2) = |
∑
nx∈h1 nx −
∑
nx∈h2 nx| ≤ ℓ1(h1, h2) = 1, and hence the sensitivity
of this query is 1.
We now show that release ofHcs andHcℓ is DP.
Lemma 8. Release ofHcs andHcℓ is ǫ2-DP.
Proof. h → Hb → (Hbs, Hbℓ) → (Hcs, Hbℓ) → (Hcs, Hcℓ) is a Markov chain. We use Theo-
rem 3 to show that the output of this Markov chain is DP for all datasets. For any two neighboring
datasets h1 and h2 can fall into one of three categories:
1. They differ in ϕT and ϕT+1.
2. They differ in ϕr and ϕr+1 for some 0 ≤ r < T − 1.
3. They differ in ϕr and ϕr+1 for some r > T .
We prove that (Hcs, Hcℓ) release is ǫ2-DP for each of the above three cases.
Case 1: We show that the process h→ Hb satisfies (7). Observe that
max
hb
Pr(Hb = hb|h2)
Pr(Hb = bb|h1)
(a)
=
Pr(ϕ¯(Hb) = ϕ¯b|ϕ¯(h2))
Pr(ϕ¯(Hb) = ϕ¯b|ϕ¯(h1))
(b)
=
Pr(ϕT (H
b) = ϕbT , ϕT+1(H
b) = ϕbT+1|ϕT (h2))
Pr(ϕT (Hb) = ϕbT , ϕT+1(H
b) = ϕbT+1|ϕ¯T (h1))
(c)
=
Pr(Zb = ϕbT − ϕT (h2))
Pr(Zb = ϕbT − ϕT (h1))
=
e−ǫ2|ϕ
b
T−ϕT (h2)|
e−ǫ2|ϕbT−ϕT (h1)|
≤ eǫ2|ϕT (h2)−ϕT (h1)|
≤ eǫ2 .
(a) follows by observing that there is a one to one correspondence between the histogram and the
prevalences, (b) follows from the fact that noise is added only to ϕT and ϕT+1, and (c) follows from
the fact that the noise added to ϕT+1 is a deterministic function of ϕT , and ϕbT+ϕ
b
T+1 = ϕ
a
T+ϕ
a
T+1
always.
Case 2: We show that (Hbs, Hbℓ) → (Hcs, Hbℓ) satisfies (7). Let Hbs1 and Hbs2 be the values of
Hbs for inputs h1 and h2 respectively. For any Zb = zb, since difference of maximums is at most
maximum of differences,∑
r
|ϕr+(Hbs2 )− ϕr+(Hbs1 )| ≤
∑
r
|ϕr+(h2)− zb − ϕr+(h1) + zb| =
∑
r
|ϕr+(h2)− ϕr+(h1)| ≤ 1.
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Hence,
Pr((Hcs, Hbℓ) = (hcs, hbℓ)|Hbs2 , Hbℓ)
Pr(Hcs, Hbℓ) = (hcs, hbℓ)|Hbs1 , Hbℓ)
=
Pr(Hcs = hcs|Hbs2 )
Pr(Hcs = hcs|Hbs1 )
=
Pr(ϕ¯r+(H
cs) = ϕ¯r+(h
cs)|ϕ¯r+(Hbs2 ))
Pr(ϕ¯r+(Hcs) = ϕ¯r+(hcs)|ϕ¯r+(Hbs1 ))
=
∏
r≥1
Pr(ϕr+(H
cs) = ϕr+(h
cs)|ϕ¯r+(Hbs2 ))
Pr(ϕr+(Hcs) = ϕr+(hcs)|ϕ¯r+(Hbs1 ))
=
∏
r≥1
e−ǫ2|ϕr+ (h
cs)−ϕr+(Hbs2 )|
e−ǫ2|ϕr+ (hcs)−ϕr+(Hbs1 )|
≤
∏
r≥1
eǫ2|ϕr+ (H
bs
2 )−ϕr+ (Hbs1 )| ≤ eǫ2 .
The first equality follows from the observation that there is a one to one correspondence between
ϕrs and ϕr+s. The second equation follows from the fact that noise added to various ϕr+s are
independent of each other. The rest of the proof follows from the definition of Geometric mechanism
and the fact that h1 and h2 are neighbors.
Case 3: We show that (Hcs, Hbℓ) → (Hcs, Hcℓ) satisfies (7). Let Hbℓ1 and Hbℓ2 are the Hbℓ’s
corresponding to h1 and h2 respectively. Conditioned on the value of Zb, for any two neighboring
histograms that differ in two consecutive r’s that are larger than T ,∑
r>T
ϕr(H
bℓ
2 )−
∑
r>T
ϕr(H
bℓ
2 ) =
∑
r>T
ϕr(h2)− ϕr(h1) = 0.
Since their sums are equal, conditioned on the value of Zb, it can be shown thatHbℓ1 , H
bℓ
2 are proper
histograms and both containmax(0,M + Zb +
∑
r>T ϕr(h1)) elements and they differ in at most
two consecutive values of r. Thus Hbℓ1 and H
bℓ
2 contain same number of counts and differ in at
most one count denoted by i∗. With these observations we now bound the ratio of probabilities for
differential privacy.
Since there is a one to one correspondence between sorted counts and the histograms, we get
Pr((Hcs, Hcℓ) = (hcs, hcℓ)|Hbℓ2 , Hcs)
Pr(Hcs, Hcℓ) = (hcs, hcℓ)|Hbℓ1 , Hcs)
=
Pr(Hcℓ = hcℓ|Hbℓ2 )
Pr(Hcℓ = hcℓ|Hbℓ1 )
=
∏
i Pr(Ni = ni|n(i)(Hbℓ2 ))∏
i Pr(Ni = ni|n(i)(Hbℓ2 ))
=
Pr(Ni∗ = ni∗ |n(i∗)(Hbℓ2 ))
Pr(Ni∗ = ni∗ |n(i∗)(Hbℓ1 ))
=
e−ǫ2|ni∗−n(i∗)(H
bℓ
2 )|
e−ǫ2|ni∗−n(i∗)(H
bℓ
1 )|
≤ eǫ2|n(i∗)(Hbℓ2 )−n(i∗)(Hbℓ1 )| ≤ eǫ2 ,
where the last set of inequalities follow from the definition of Geometric mechanism and the fact
that the noise added to N(i)s are independent of each other, and n(i∗) is the only count in which the
two histograms differ.
We now show that PRIVHIST-HIGPRIVACY is ǫ3-DP.
Lemma 9. PRIVHIST-HIGPRIVACY is ǫ3-DP.
Proof. Observe that h → Hv → Hw → Hx → Hy is a Markov chain, hence it suffices to prove
Hv → Hw is ǫ3-DP.
Let h1 and h2 are two neighboring datasets. Without loss of generality, let they differ in ϕk and
ϕk+1. Let hv1 and h
v
2 be the two histograms obtained after quanitzation step (3). Since h1 and h2
differ only at k and k + 1, hv1 and h
v
2 differ only in ϕ
v
si−1 and ϕ
v
si for some i. Furthermore,
|ϕvsi−1 (hv1)− ϕvsi−1(hv2)| = |ϕvsi(hv1)− ϕvsi (hv2)| ≤
1
si − si−1 .
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For all j /∈ {si−1, si}, ϕvj (hv1) = ϕvj (hv2). Hence ϕvsi+(hv1) 6= ϕvsi+(hv2) for only one value of i, let
i∗ be this value.
Pr(Hw = hw|hv1)
Pr(Hw = hw|hv2)
=
∏
i
Pr(ϕsi+(H
w) = ϕsi+(h
w)|ϕsi+(hv1))
Pr(ϕsi+(H
w) = ϕsi+(h
w)|ϕsi+(hv2))
=
Pr(ϕs∗i+(H
w) = ϕs∗i+(h
w)|ϕs∗i+(hv1))
Pr(ϕs∗i+(H
w) = ϕs∗i+(h
w)|ϕs∗i+(hv2))
=
Pr(Zsi∗ = ϕs∗i+(h
w)− ϕsi∗+(hv1))
Pr(Zsi∗ = ϕs∗i+(h
w)− ϕsi∗+(hv2))
≤ exp
(
ǫ3(si∗ − si∗−1)
si∗ − si∗−1
)
≤ eǫ3 .
D Utility analysis of PRIVHIST
Let Ho be the output of either PRIVHIST-LOWPRIVACY or PRIVHIST-HIGHPRIVACY. In both the
low and high privacy regimes, the output error can be bounded as
ℓ1(h,H
o)1N>0 + n1N≤0.
Furthermore,
E[n1N≤0] ≤ ne−nǫ1 . e−ǫ1/2, 4
where the last inequality, follows by breaking it in to cases n = 0 and n > 0. The bound on
E[|N − n|] follows from the fact that N = n + G(e−ǫ1), Lemma 2, and the moments of the
geometric distribution. In the next two sections, we bound ℓ1(h,Ho)1N>0 for both low privacy and
high privacy regimes.
D.1 Low privacy regime
In the following analysis, let Z be a geometric random variable distributed as G(e−ǫ2). Let Hb
′
=
Hbs +Hbℓ. For the bounds on the histogram, by Lemma 6 and triangle inequality,
ℓ1(h,H
e) ≤ 4ℓ1(Ha, Hd) ≤ 4ℓ1(Hb′ , Hd) + 4ℓ1(Hb′ , Ha). (8)
For the second term, observe that since Hb
′
is obtained by moving Zb terms between T and T + 1
and then majorizing it. If |Zb| ≤M , then majorization does not change the histogram. Hence,
ℓ1(H
b′ , Ha) = ℓ1(H
b′ , Ha)1|Zb|≤M + ℓ1(H
b′ , Ha)1|Zb|>M ≤ |Zb|+(n+2M(T +1))1|Zb|>M .
Taking expectation on both sides
EN [ℓ1(H
b′ , Ha)] ≤ E[|Zb|+ (n+ 2M(T + 1))1|Zb|>M ] . E[Z] +
n+N
N2
e−2ǫ2.5 (9)
For the first term, by Lemma 3,
ℓ1(H
b′ , Hd) ≤ ℓ1(Hbs, Hds) + ℓ1(Hbℓ, Hdℓ). (10)
We now bound both the terms above. For the large counts, let ij be the index of the noisy count
N(i)(H
bℓ).
ℓ1(H
bℓ, Hdℓ) ≤
∑
i
|N(i)(Hbℓ)−N(i)(Hdℓ)|
≤
∑
i
|N(i)(Hbℓ)−Nij (Hdℓ)|
≤
∑
i
|N(i)(Hbℓ)−Nij (Hcℓ)|.
4We use . instead of O notation and & instead of Ω notation for compactness.
5
EN denotes conditional expectation w.r.t. N
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Since the number of terms above T is at most n/T +M + Zb, in expectation,
EN [ℓ1(H
bℓ, Hdℓ)] ≤ E
[∑
i
|Zcℓi |
]
.
(n
T
+M + E|Z|
)
· E[|Z|]. (11)
For the smaller counts observe that
ℓ1(H
bs, Hds) ≤
∑
r≥0
|ϕbsr+ − ϕdsr+|
(a)
≤ 2
∑
r≥0
|ϕbsr+ − ϕmonr+ |
(b)
≤ 2
√
T ·
√∑
r≥0
(ϕbsr+ − ϕmonr+ )2
(c)
≤ 2
√
T ·
√∑
r≥0
(ϕbsr+ − ϕcsr+)2
≤ 2
√
T ·
√∑
r≥0
(Zcsr − Zb)2, (12)
where (a) follows from the fact that rounding off increases the error at most by 2 (Lemma 5), (b)
follows by the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, and (c) follows from the fact that ϕbsr+ are monotonic
and hence monotonic projection only decreases the error. Hence in expectation,
EN [ℓ1(H
bs, Hds)] . T
√
E[Z2]. (13)
Combining (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), and (13),
EN [ℓ1(h,H
e)] . |Z|+ 4T
√
E[Z2] + 2
(n
T
+M + E|Z|
)
· E[|Z|] + n+N
N2
e−2ǫ2 .
Substituting T = ⌈√N⌉ andM = ⌈ 2 logNeǫ2ǫ2 ⌉, yields
EN [ℓ1(h,H
e)] . |Z|+
√
N
√
E[Z2] + 2
(
1 +
n√
N
+
logNǫ2
ǫ2
+ E|Z|
)
·E[|Z|] + n+N
N
e−2ǫ2 .
Taking expectation w.r.t. N and using Lemma 2 yields
E[ℓ1(h,H
e)1N>0] .
√
nE[Z2] + e−2ǫ2 .
√
ne−ǫ/6,
where the last inequality follows from moments of geometric distribution.
D.2 High privacy utility
For the high privacy regime, by the triangle inequality,
ℓ1(h,H
y) ≤ ℓ1(h,Hu) + ℓ1(Hu, Hy). (14)
For the first term, since we are only reducing counts of certain elements,
E[ℓ1(h,H
u)] ≤ E[1N<n/2n] ≤ e−nǫ1/2n . 1
ǫ1
. (15)
The second term can be bounded as
E[ℓ1(H
u, Hy)] ≤
∑
r>0
|ϕr+(Hu)− ϕr+(Hy)|
(a)
≤ 2
∑
r>0
|ϕr+(Hu)− ϕr+(Hx)|
≤2
∑
r>0
|ϕr+(Hu)− ϕr+(Hv)|+ |ϕr+(Hx)− ϕr+(Hv)|, (16)
20
where (a) follows by Lemma 5 and the last inequality follows by the triangle inequality. The first
term in the last equation corresponds to the smoothing error and we analyze it now.
ϕvsi+1+ =
si+1∑
r=si
ϕur
(r − si)
si+1 − si +
∑
r>si+1
ϕur .
Since ϕvj = 0 for j /∈ S,
si+1−1∑
j=si
|ϕvj+ − ϕuj+| =
si+1−1∑
j=si
∣∣∣∣∣∣
si+1∑
r=si
ϕur
(r − si)
si+1 − si −
si+1∑
r=j
ϕur
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
si+1∑
j=si
si+1∑
r=si
ϕur
∣∣∣∣ (r − si)si+1 − si − 1r≥j
∣∣∣∣
=
si+1∑
r=si
2ϕur
(r − si)(si+1 − r)
si+1 − si
≤ 2
si+1∑
r=si
ϕur min(si+1 − r, r − si).
For r ≤ T ′, that lies between si and si+1 in S,
|r − si| ≤ min(⌊T (1 + q)i+1⌋ − r, r − ⌊T (1 + q)i⌋) . rq.
If r ≥ T ′, the analysis depends on the value of Zb. If Zb ≥ −M , r ≥ T ′, and ϕur > 0, then
there exists a si that is at most Zcli away for from r. If not, then the error is at most 2n. Hence, the
smoothing error in expectation can be bounded by
.
T ′∑
r≥T
ϕur qr +
∑
r≥T ′
ϕurEN [|Z|1Zb≥−M ] + EN [2n1Zb<−M ] . nq +
nE[|Z|]
T ′
+
n
N
. (17)
For the second part,
∑
r≥1
|ϕvr+ − ϕxr+|
(a)
≤
∑
si∈S
|ϕvsi+ − ϕxsi+|(si − si−1)
(b)
≤
√
|S| ·
√∑
si∈S
(ϕvsi+ − ϕxsi+)2(si − si−1)2
(c)
≤
√
|S| ·
√∑
si∈S
(ϕwsi+ − ϕxsi+)2(si − si−1)2,
where (a) follows by observing that ϕxr = 0 for r /∈ S, (b) follows from the Cauchy-Schwarz
inequality. (c) follows from the fact that projecting on to the simplex only increases the error. By
the second moments of Zsi , taking expectation on both sides yields∑
r≥1
EN |ϕvr+ − ϕxr+| . |S| ·
1
ǫ
.
We now bound the size of the set S. By step (2) of the algorithm, number of elements in S can be
bounded by
. T + 1 + log1+q
T ′
T
+
10n
T ′
+ U,
where U is the number of elements less than T ′/10 in Hbℓ, that upon adding noise increases to T ′.
Expectation of U conditioned onN is
EN [U ] .
(n
T
+M + E[|Z|]
)
e−9T
′ǫ2/10 .
(
n√
Nǫ
+ 1 +
logN
ǫ
)
e−3
√
N/ǫ .
nǫ
N
+ 1, (18)
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where the second inequality follows by substituting T ′ = 10
√
N/ǫ33 and third inequality follows by
algebraic manipulation. Combining (14), (15), (16), (17), and (18), and using the fact that quantiza-
tion error is at most O(n) yields
. nq1N>n/2 + n1N≤n/2 +
nE[|Z|]
T ′
+
(
T + 1 + log1+q
T ′
T
+
n
T ′
+
nǫ
N
)
1
ǫ
+
n
N
. nq +
(√
Nǫ+
1
q
log
2
ǫ
+
n
√
ǫ3√
N
+
nǫ
N
)
1
ǫ
+
n
N
+ n1N≤n/2
.
(√
N + 1 +
n√
N
)√
1
ǫ
log
2
ǫ
+
n
√
ǫ√
N
+
n
N
+ n1N≤n/2,
where the last equation follows by substituting the value of q =
√
1
Nǫ3
log 1ǫ3 . Taking expectation
with respect to N and using Lemma 2 and the fact that nǫ & 1 yields,
E[ℓ1(h,H
z)1N>0] .
√
n
ǫ
· log 2
ǫ
+
1
ǫ
.
D.3 Time complexity
In this section, we provide a proof sketch of the time complexity. Suppose ǫ > 1. The number of
prevalences in Hbs is T .
√
N . Similarly, the number of counts in Hbℓ is n/T ≈ n/√N . Further,
the number of additional fake counts added is M . logN and the isotonic regression using PAVA
takes linear in the size of the input. Hence, the expected run time, conditioned on N is at most√
N + n√
N
+M , which upon taking expectation w.r.t. N yields an expected run time of
√
n.
If ǫ ≤ 1, steps (1)-(4) in PRIVHIST takes time . √N/ǫ + logN/ǫ. The time complexity to find
boundaries, smooth prevalences, add noise, and perform isotonic regression is |S| + √n. By the
utility analysis, |S| .
√
N log 1ǫ +
n
√
ǫ√
N
. Summing all the time complexities and taking expectation
w.r.t. N similar to the utility analysis, yields a total time complexity of O˜
(√
n
ǫ +
logn
ǫ
)
.
E Lower bound in the low privacy regime
Lemma 10. Let x ∈ {0, 1}k. Suppose two vectors x, y are neighbors if ||x−y||1 ≤ 1. If Xˆ = M(x)
be an ǫ-DP estimate of x, then
max
x∈{0,1}k
E[||x− Xˆ||1] & ke−ǫ.
Proof. Let p(x) be the uniform distribution over {0, 1}k. For a vector v ∈ {0, 1}k−1, let X iv denote
the two vectors such that xi−11 = v
i−1
1 and x
k
i+1 = v
k−1
i . Then
max
x∈{0,1}k
E[||x − Xˆ||1] ≥ 1
2k
∑
x∈{0,1}k
E[||x− Xˆ||1]
=
1
2k
∑
x∈{0,1}k
k∑
i=1
E|xi − Xˆi|
=
k∑
i=1
1
2k
∑
x∈{0,1}k
E|xi − Xˆi|
=
k∑
i=1
1
2k−1
∑
v∈{0,1}k−1
1
2
∑
x∈X iv
E|xi − Xˆi|. (19)
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For any v and i, vectors in X iv are neighbors and hence by the definition of DP,∑
x∈X iv
E|xi − Xˆi| =
∑
xˆi
Pr(Xˆi = xˆi|xi = 1)|1− xˆi|+ Pr(Xˆi = xˆi|xi = 0)|0− xˆi|
≥
∑
xˆi
Pr(Xˆi = xˆi|xi = 1)|1− xˆi|+ e−ǫ Pr(Xˆi = xˆi|xi = 1)|0− xˆi|
≥ e−ǫ
∑
xˆi
Pr(Xˆi = xˆi|xi = 1)
≥ e−ǫ.
Substituting the above lower bound in (19) yields the lemma.
We now use the above bound to prove Theorem 2. We first define a of histograms to show the
lower bound. Let k =
√
n/10. For a given vector x ∈ {0, 1}k, let ϕ4i = ϕ4i+3 = xi−1 and
ϕ4i+1 = ϕ4i+2 = 1 − xi−1, ϕr = 1 for r = n −
∑4k
i=1 ϕrr, and ϕr = 0 otherwise. Observe that∑
r≥1 ϕrr = n and are valid histograms. If two vectors x and y have hamming distance d, then the
corresponding distance between anonymized histograms is 2d.
Consider a slightly different definition of neighboring datasets over histograms, where two datasets
are neighboring if the neighboring datasets are distance 2 apart. If a mechanism is ǫ-DP in the previ-
ous definition of neighboring datasets, then the mechanism is 2ǫ-DP in the new notion of neighbors.
One mechanism for releasing the vectors x ∈ {0, 1}k with 2ǫ-DP is to encode it as the histograms
as mentioned above and release them. Since such a mechanism has hamming distance & ke−2ǫ,
the anonymized histograms cannot be estimated with accuracy & ke−2ǫ with 2ǫ-DP under new
definition of neighbors and hence it cannot be estimated with accuracy & ke−2ǫ with ǫ-DP under
the old definition of neighbors.
F Proof of Corollary 1
Recall thatN is the DP estimate of n andH is the DP estimate of h. In the following LetXn be the
initial set of n samples. Let XN be N samples obtained from p,Xn as follows. If N < n, obtain
XN by removing n−N samples uniformly fromXn. IfN ≥ n, addN − n samples from p toXn.
Note thatXN are N i.i.d. samples from p. We bound the error of the estimator as follows.
f(p)− fˆp = (f(p)− fˆp)1N>0 + (f(p)− fˆp)1N=0.
Taking expectation on the second term,
E[(f(p)− fˆp)1N=0] = E[f(p)1N=0] ≤ f(p)e−ncǫ,
for some constant c. For the case N > 0, we bound as follows.
f(p)− fˆp
= f(p)−
∑
r≥1
f(r,N)ϕr(H)
= f(p)−
∑
r≥1
f(r,N)ϕr(h(X
N )) +
∑
r≥1
f(r,N)ϕr(h(X
N))−
∑
r≥1
f(r,N)ϕr(h(X
n))
+
∑
r≥1
f(r,N)ϕr(h(X
n))−
∑
r≥1
f(r,N)ϕr(H).
We bound each of the three (difference) terms above. First observe that by the assumptions in the
theorem:
EN
[∣∣∣f(p)−∑
r≥1
f(r,N)ϕr(h(X
N))
∣∣∣] ≤ E(fˆ , N) ≤ E(fˆ , n) + |N − n|Nβ
N
.
SinceXN andXn differ in at mostN − n terms, by the properties of sorted ℓ1 distance,∑
r≥1
f(r,N)ϕr(h(X
N ))−
∑
r≥1
f(r,N)ϕr(h(X
n)) ≤ |N − n|max
r
|f(r,N)| ≤ |N − n| · N
β
N
.
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Further by the properties of sorted ℓ1 distance,
EN [|
∑
r≥1
f(r,N)ϕr(h(X
n))−
∑
r≥1
f(r,N)ϕr(H)|] ≤ max
r
|f(r,N)|EN [ℓ1(h,H)]
.
Nβ
N
· EN [ℓ1(h,H)].
Summing all the three terms, we get the error is at most
. E(fˆ , n) + |N − n| · N
β
N
+
Nβ
N
· EN [ℓ1(h,H)]. (20)
For ǫ > 1, difference between expected error and E(fˆ , n) is at most
. E
[
Nβ
N
|N − n|1N>0 + N
β
N
(√
N +
n√
N
)
1N>0
]
e−cǫ
. E
[
Nβ
N
|N − n|1N>n/2 + N
β
N
(√
N +
n√
N
)
1N>n/2
]
e−cǫ + E
[
n1n/2≥N>0
]
e−cǫ
. E
[
nβ
n
|N − n|+ n
β
√
n
]
e−cǫ + E
[
n1n/2≥N>0
]
e−cǫ
. nβ−1/2e−cǫ + ne−nc
′ǫ
. nβ−1/2e−cǫ,
where the last inequality uses the fact that ǫ > 1. Combining the result with the case N = 0, we get
that
E[|f(p)− fˆp|] . E(fˆ , n) + nβ−1/2e−cǫ + f(p)e−nǫ.
The result for ǫ > 1 follows if
n ≥ max
(
n(fˆ , α),O
((
1
αecǫ
) 2
1−2β
+
1
ǫ
log
fmax
α
))
.
For Ω(1/n) ≤ ǫ ≤ 1, by (20), the difference between expected error and E(fˆ , n) is at most
E
[
Nβ
N
(
|N − n|+
√
N
√
1
ǫ
log
2
ǫ
+
n
√
ǫ√
N
+
n
N
)
1N>0
]
. E
[
Nβ
N
(
|N − n|+
√
N
√
1
ǫ
log
2
ǫ
+
n
√
ǫ√
N
+
n
N
)
1N>n/2
]
+ E
[(√
1
ǫ
log
2
ǫ
+ n
)
1n/2≥N>0
]
. E
[
nβ
n
|N − n|+ n
β
n
(
√
n
√
1
ǫ
log
2
ǫ
)]
+ E
[(√
1
ǫ
log
2
ǫ
+ n
)
1n/2≥N>0
]
.
nβ
nǫ
+
nβ√
n
√
1
ǫ
log
2
ǫ
+
(√
1
ǫ
log
2
ǫ
+ n
)
e−ncǫ
.
nβ√
n
√
1
ǫ
log
2
ǫ
+ ne−ncǫ.
Combining with the result with the case, N = 0, we get
E[|f(p)− fˆp|] . E(fˆ , n) + nβ−1/2
√
1
ǫ
log
2
ǫ
+ (n+ f(p))e−ncǫ.
The result for Ω(1/n) ≤ ǫ < 1 follows if
n ≥ max

n(fˆ , α),O


(√
log(2/ǫ)
α
√
ǫ
) 2
1−2β
+
1
ǫ
log
fmax
αǫ



 .
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